A Holistic Approach to Security Policies – Policy Distribution with XACML over COPS  by Peters, Jan et al.
A Holistic Approach to Security Policies –
Policy Distribution with XACML over COPS
Jan Petersa Roland Riekeb Tauﬁq Rochaelic
Bjo¨rn Steinemannb Ruben Wolfb
a Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Graphics Research IGD, Germany
b Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology SIT, Germany
c Technical University of Darmstadt, Department of Computer Science, IT-Security group, Germany
Abstract
The potentials of modern information technology can only be exploited, if the underlying infrastructure and
the applied applications suﬃciently take into account all aspects of IT security. This paper presents the
platform architecture of the SicAri project, which aims to build a security platform for ubiquitous Internet
usage, and gives an overview of the implicitly and explicitly used security mechanisms to enable access
control for service oriented applications in distributed environments. The paper will introduce the security
policy integration concept with a special focus on distribution of security policies within the service infras-
tructure for transparent policy enforcement. We describe in details our extensions of the COPS protocol to
transport XACML payload for security policy distribution and policy decision requests/responses.
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1 Introduction
Professional usage of today’s communication and collaboration infrastructures re-
quires the consideration of appropriate security measures. In this paper, we intro-
duce the SicAri [4] project – an interdisciplinary approach to information security.
The project covers technical, cryptographic and usability issues, as well as various
legal issues in information security with respect to legislation and jurisdiction. The
overall goal is the conception and realization of a Java-based security platform and
its tools for ubiquitous Internet usage.
This platform supplies a bunch of applications and provides various security
services to the user in a transparent, seamless and integrated way. It is a modular
and integrative platform that allows the connection of various end user devices,
such as PCs, PDAs, and ambient intelligence devices and gives support for various
network types (e. g., wired and wireless networks) and communication paradigms
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(e. g., client-server, peer-to-peer or ad-hoc networks). The behavior of the platform
in terms of security related action can be determined by security policies. They
provide a well-understood and suitable means to administer security issues. Such
policies allow to separate the administration, decision ﬁnding, and enforcement of
access control. But using policies raise additional questions in distributed environ-
ments where applications, services and nodes dynamically join and leave the system.
The distribution of policies, especially at bootstrapping time, and their update and
synchronization process has to be particularly considered. While open standards
and open source solutions for single isolated tasks around security policies exist we
have not been aware of any open holistic approach to them.
This paper ﬁrst presents the SicAri platform from a conceptual, an architectural,
and partially from an implementation point of view, but the main focus is on our
distribution model of the underlying platform security policy which is based on the
Common Open Policy Service (COPS) protocol. We extended the COPS protocol
with a client type speciﬁcation to transport eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) policies.
The subsequent paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the
layers and the components of the platform. The holistic security policy approach
is described in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the policy processing including
policy enforcement, policy decision and policy distribution. Section 5 considers
some related work. Finally, the paper ends with an outlook in Section 6.
2 The SicAri Platform
The main function of the SicAri platform is to provide interfaces to the user’s appli-
cation to access the services provided by the platform, which are basic services and
application services (see below). Together with the middleware, the platform also
provides the communication infrastructure between distributed components. This
is realized through a consistent service management comprising service discovery,
service description, and service invocation. If desired, local services are automati-
cally provided as Web services to remote platforms during runtime, which enables
the interoperability of our service platform with other service-oriented architectures.
In case of new users requiring new application services, the platform architecture
supports modular and extensible building blocks, adding the possibility to incor-
porate new services. Therefore, reusability of existing building blocks should be as
easy as possible for developers.
All security related aspects of a platform instance are regulated by a security
policy. In the case of multiple platforms interacting with each other, all platforms
running in the same SicAri infrastructure share the same security policy. Each
platform has its own policy enforcement component. Access attempts to local or
remote services and resources are checked against the security policy considering the
requester’s current session ID with respect to a single-sign-on mechanism, activated
roles, the available permissions, and other parameters. In addition to policy deci-
sion and enforcement, the platform further covers the aspects of policy generation,
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administration, and validation (cf. Section 3).
Thereby, the platform’s architecture features a holistic approach to security
policies based on current standards and the support of implicit and explicit secu-
rity mechanisms in heterogeneous and distributed service infrastructures. Mobile
devices can easily be connected to this infrastructure directly, when running the
SicAri middleware, resp. through security-aware gateway components and speciﬁc
protocols, in case the full platform does not execute on the mobile device due to
resource limitations.
In spite of the platform features mentioned above, the platform is not intended
to completely replace the existing information infrastructure nor its existing secu-
rity mechanism, such as ﬁrewall, etc. The platform rather gives the opportunity of
building distributed and security-centered applications on top of its service infras-
tructure, which can easily be extended or be plugged into existing infrastructures.
2.1 Platform Architecture
Figure 1 (left-hand side) gives a high-level overview of the generic service architec-
ture. On top of the middleware, there is a service and application layer. A locally
authenticated user can directly interact with applications deﬁned on this layer.
The applications themselves make use of the basic and application-speciﬁc services
of the platform’s service layer. On the one hand, these services integrate external
databases, legacy systems and applications; on the other hand, they provide ba-
sic security mechanisms, such as authentication or access control. The middleware
layer is responsible for the secure and seamless integration and communication of
applications and services, locally and remote.
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Fig. 1. High-level and layered architecture of the SicAri platform
The platform is based on the SicAri kernel (see right-hand side of Figure 1) which
runs on top of a Java Virtual Machine and thereby attracts a broad spectrum of
potential users and of potential devices, ranging from mobile devices and personal
computers to scalable, distributed environments. The user application that runs
on the platform accesses obligatory basic services and optional application services
provided by the platform. The entirety of installed services thereby constitutes
the characteristic and speciﬁc use case of the local platform instance. Thus, this
platform is rather a collection of services which are ﬂexibly loaded and conﬁgured
within a common environment on top of a Java Virtual Machine, than a monolithic
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system designed as one static piece of software. Due to this architecture the platform
oﬀers the following advantages: minimalist design, modularity and reusability of
services, extensibility, maintainability and intrinsic security features of the kernel.
2.2 Platform Components
This sections brieﬂy describes the basic components of the architecture.
Environment. The environment is a hierarchical name space for service object in-
stances. Object instances can be registered, looked up, searched for, and removed.
This mechanism for local service management and service discovery is extended
by the transparent use of Web services for platform communication among dis-
tributed platforms. Services registered within this environment are implicitly
encapsulated by a security proxy which enforces the current security policy on a
search resp. access request to a service object.
Shell. The shell is a user interface for the environment. It allows administration of
and access to the environment. Hence, it supports at least the afore mentioned
operations register, lookup, search, and remove of object instances. Furthermore
it allows navigation in the name space and invoking of Java methods. The SicAri
shell compares to a UNIX Shell, where the environment stands for the ﬁle systems
and services can be compared with ﬁles.
Security Manager. The security manager is responsible for policy enforcement.
The Java programming language provides a standard security manager [8] which
is accessible via an API. SicAri replaces this security manager with an own im-
plementation.
Service. A service is a piece of software which fulﬁlls a very speciﬁc task. It
provides a small, well-deﬁned programming interface. Typically there is no direct
interaction between the user and a service. Every service is published as an
object instance in the environment which allows access from other services and
applications. Services are retrieved by means of the environment’s search and
lookup functionality. The service may be separated in a local access stub and
one or more remote components which provide the functionality. Further, a
service can integrate legacy applications and external data sources into the SicAri
architecture, by means of a wrapper or proxy.
SicAri kernel. The SicAri kernel (or just kernel) consists of the Java implemen-
tations of the environment, the shell, and the SicAri security manager as deﬁned
above. Together they provide service bootstrapping and conﬁguration, local ser-
vice management (registration/searching), and a consistent security context by
means of implicit access control.
SicAri platform. The platform consists of the kernel started on top of a Java
Virtual Machine, a number of mandatory basic services, and optional application
services. Any application can rely upon the availability of the basic services, as
there are among others the authentication manager, the identity manager, the
cryptographic key master, and the policy service.
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SicAri infrastructure. The infrastructure is a compound of several platforms
managed by the same security policy. These platforms may be distributed within
the infrastructure.
SicAri application. An application is a software which fulﬁlls a complex task.
Since it usually interacts with the user, it provides both an interfaces for user-
interaction and a programming interface. Applications make use of services in
order to fulﬁll their tasks.
3 Holistic Approach to Security Policies
Policy-based control of networks and computer systems has the beneﬁt that the
controlling units of the system are kept decoupled from the management compo-
nents and the rule base that governs the decisions. This enables the administrator
to easily run, manage and change the system’s behavior without having to modify
the software or the controlled nodes. The system is controlled by policies that spec-
ify behavior rules which are interpreted by decision components and are asserted
by enforcement components. Hence, if conditions change or new services or appli-
cations are added to the system one just adapts the policy rules. Using a central
administration component the platform administrator does not have to deal with
the multitude of diﬀerent nodes in the system. This applies to network management
issues, e. g. Quality of Service (QoS) or resource allocation, as well as to network
and service security.
All security related tasks of the platform are controlled by a security policy.
The platform covers various aspects of security policies, such as policy speciﬁcation,
policy patterns and policy compiler (see below), policy decision and enforcement,
policy negotiation and provisioning, policy administration, and conﬂict resolution.
Thereby, the security policy integration concept is based on manifold requirements
with respect to policies, as for example:
• Control of all security related processes and tasks. Impossibility to bypass the
policy enforcement component.
• Compatibility of the policy framework with the platform’s plug-in approach.
No need to change existing or upcoming services in order to enforce the plat-
form’s security policy. Transparency of policy control.
• Consideration of trade-oﬀ between expressiveness and complexity of the policy
description language.
• Support for platform administrators during policy management.
It is another goal of the platform to bridge the gap between the informal speci-
ﬁcation of security policies (i. e., what the security administrator wants to enforce)
and its corresponding machine-readable policy speciﬁcation (i. e., what the system
actually enforces).
J. Peters et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 143–157 147
3.1 Policy Architecture
The policy architecture comprises the components of the policy framework and their
interactions in order to guarantee that all security relevant processes in the platform
are fulﬁlled according to the underlying security policy. Access control policies are
based on the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) standard. The general concepts of
RBAC are well-understood and extensively described in the literature, please refer
to [6,12,18]. RBAC is assumed to be policy-neutral. This means that RBAC pro-
vides a ﬂexible means to deal with arbitrary security policies. The policy integration
concept of the SicAri platform requires the interaction of various components. Our
implementation of RBAC uses XACML [11] as its speciﬁcation language.
XACML thereby serves as ”glue” between a couple of policy components: Start-
ing with the policy generation process which leads to XACML-based user-role as-
signments and XACML-based role-permission assignments, this XACML speciﬁca-
tion is used as basis for policy validation, afterwards. The validated policy then is
distributed to resp. updated at all PDPs, and subsequently used for policy decisions.
Figure 2 depicts the component framework of the SicAri policy architecture.
The remainder of this section gives a more detailed overview of all the components
involved and their interactions with other components.
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Fig. 2. Policy components of the SicAri platform
Policy Generation. We currently focus on generation of policies for access con-
trol to resources representing the required security properties. Such a policy is
generated using policy patterns formalized in OWL [21] that allow to specify tem-
plate policy archetypes for recurring security requirements. Policies are usually
derived from security requirements of business or organizational goals. For exam-
ple, the execution of the tasks ”credit request” and ”credit approval” with respect
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to a banking scenario require two diﬀerent persons to give their aﬃrmation to
complete the task. This security requirement can be satisﬁed by introducing an
assignment constraint in the model, for example, separation of duty.
Policy generation leads to a policy speciﬁcation conforming with the RBAC
proﬁle of the XACML 2.0 standard [13].
Policy Validation The task of the policy validation component is to evaluate,
whether a policy correctly implements given security goals. We extended the SH
veriﬁcation tool [14,15] to accept a subset of XACML as input and to translate
it into transition patterns, which specify the behavior of Asynchronous Product
Automata (APA). APA are a class of general communicating automata and pro-
vide a means to model arbitrary distributed systems while transition patterns
deﬁne the possible state transitions of the modeled system. Each policy rule is
converted into such a transition pattern which then encodes the action that is
controlled by that rule. This in turn results in an operational model of the policy
system that can be executed in the SH veriﬁcation tool. It allows to analyze the
policy system’s behavior, to simulate its potential information ﬂow and to verify
the wanted security goals. For that purpose the system’s reachability graph is
computed which spans all possible sequences of transition steps that are allowed
by the given policy.
We have chosen to support a subset of XACML that comprises the most im-
portant elements and attributes of the language. One ﬁrst goal was to reach
the expressiveness that allows to handle one well-known XACML example which
has been validated in the literature before [2,7]. Some concepts of XACML like
obligations and rule combining algorithms are not yet supported.
Policy Administration. Even if the ability of automated security policy genera-
tion is provided by the platform, there may be the need of ﬁne granular policy
administration, e. g. a new user needs to be added, or the permissions of a user or
role need to be changed. Therefore, we provide an administration API based on
the RBAC standard and a corresponding graphical user interface (cf. Figure 3).
Fig. 3. Policy administration
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Policy Provisioning. The components for policy generation, validation, and ad-
ministration mutually share access to the global security policy database con-
taining the current XACML-based policy speciﬁcation. This whole policy spec-
iﬁcation resp. changes of policy subsets are subsequently distributed by policy
provisioning components. The component covers distribution of policies, policy
updates, as well as transport of policy decision requests and responses. Policy
provisioning is outlined in more detail in the next section.
Policy Decision. The policy decision component uses an extended version of
SUN’s reference implementation of an XACML evaluator [19]. It comprises of
library classes that can be used in building a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) or
a Policy Decision Point (PDP). Since we use the RBAC proﬁle of the XACML 2.0
standard to specify our policies, some modiﬁcations were necessary in order to
evaluate these XACML policies.
As described above, the policies in form of an RBAC model are stored into three
diﬀerent categories, namely: Role Policy Set (RPS), Permission Policy Set (PPS)
and Role Authorization (RA). The RPS and the PPS contain the roles deﬁnition
and their corresponding permissions, respectively. Therefore, each RPS has a
reference to the corresponding PPS. However, the implementation of SunXACML
version 1.2 does not support references in policy. Therefore, we have extended
this implementation accordingly to actually support policy references.
Policy Enforcement. The policy enforcement component assures that all security
relevant tasks can only be fulﬁlled if they are in accordance with the underly-
ing security policy. The policy enforcement component detects security relevant
tasks, consults the policy decision component in order to decide upon a task, and
enforces the policy decisions, i. e. allows a platform entity to access a platform
resource or not.
SicAri Services. Interaction between applications and services and between one
service and another as well as access of local resources within services is implicitly
controlled by the policy enforcement component. Except the situation that a ser-
vice wants to explicitly request the policy decision component, policy processing
is done transparently during service execution. That is, SicAri services do not
have to be aware of the existence of a security policy. As consequence, there is no
need to modify or adapt existing or upcoming services to be compatible with the
policy integration concept. The only thing that needs to be done by a security
administrator is to conﬁgure resp. re-generate the security policy according to the
security requirements in the context of new services integrated into the service
infrastructure.
Platform Authentication. Finally and as another precondition for policy en-
forcement e. g. by means of access authorization, every acting entity in the service
infrastructure has to be successfully authenticated. Thus, several authentication
modules are provided locally on a platform instance to allow diﬀerent user lo-
gin procedures according to the speciﬁc use case and characteristic of the local
platform instance.
J. Peters et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 168 (2007) 143–157150
4 Policy Distribution with COPS and XACML
This sections takes on the policy distribution issue from the introduction. The
protocol framework for Policy Based Network Management (PBN) which has been
deﬁned by the IETF Resource Allocation Protocol (RAP) work group oﬀers a good
solution to those questions.
4.1 Policy Distribution with COPS
The core of the RAP framework is the COPS [5] protocol. It provides a means
to communicate policies and policy decisions in a distributed system. The main
characteristics are
(i) the logical and architectural separation of policy enforcement and policy de-
cision components, (ii) a client/server model of PEP and PDP, (iii) reliable trans-
port of messages between PEP and PDP via TCP, (iv) a ﬂexible and extensible
framework through self-identifying objects that allow to deﬁne arbitrary protocol
payload, and (v) a stateful communication between PEP and PDP which share re-
quest/decision states that allow the PDP to asynchronously update decisions and
conﬁguration information at the PEP.
COPS is designed to be used in two basic scenarios – outsourcing and conﬁgura-
tion. In the conﬁguration scenario a local Policy Decision Point (LPDP) is available
and in the outsourcing scenario there is none. In the ﬁrst case the PEP asks the
LPDP for local policy decisions and in the latter case the PEP delegates all policy
decisions to the remote PDP. Since the conﬁguration scenario has already been im-
plemented in SicAri its concept is described in more detail in the next paragraph.
Section 4.2 explains how both scenarios integrate into the platform architecture.
COPS in Conﬁguration Mode
In conﬁguration mode the PEP requisitions a whole conﬁguration for a compo-
nent. Because COPS is policy independent the conﬁgured component can be such
diﬀerent things as router hardware or Web services.
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RPT
RPT
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Fig. 4. Conﬁguration request
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Figure 4 shows the schematic sequence of the COPS conﬁguration procedure
in form of a Message Sequence Chart (MSC). When a service is started for the
ﬁrst time it contacts the PEP. The PEP sends a client open message (OPN) to the
corresponding PDP. This message contains a unique ID that identiﬁes the PEP to
the PDP and it also contains a client speciﬁc information (ClientSI) object. This
object is necessary to enable the PDP to relay the OPN message to a PDP module
that can handle the requests for the incoming type of policy.
When the PDP is capable to serve the client type it answers with a client accept
(CAT) message and expects incoming requests. In the conﬁguration scenario the PEP
sends one or more request messages (REQ) that contain context objects which identify
the message as conﬁguration requests. The request messages also comprise ClientSI
objects that carry client speciﬁc information on the requested conﬁguration data.
Each conﬁguration request may be answered with a single decision message (DEC)
or a stream thereof. On reception and successful installation of the conﬁguration
data the PEP acknowledges this to the PDP with a report state message (RPT) for
each of the DEC messages. When the PEP ﬁnally has received all conﬁguration data
from the PDP it signals the installation back to the SicAri service which now can
rely on the LPDP to decide access requests.
From now on the PDP proactively keeps the policy at the PEP side up to date.
Whenever a change to the master policy at the PDP side is made, it passes it on
to all PEPs that make use of this policy. For that purpose both parties regularly
exchange keep alive (KA) messages to assure that the PEP always uses a policy that
is up to date.
4.2 Platform Integration
This section describes how the two policy distribution approaches can be integrated
into the platform architecture.
In contrast to the COPS speciﬁcation, the deﬁnition of PEP and LPDP in
SicAri are slightly diﬀerent: Whereas the PEP in COPS is deﬁned as a local client
component communicating with a global PDP, in the COPS policy conﬁguration
scenario this component corresponds best to the LPDP, as deﬁned in SicAri (cf.
Figure 4 vs. Figure 5 (a)).
COPS Policy Conﬁguration
The main characteristics of this scenario are the local PEP and LPDP (cf. Fig-
ure 5 (a)). The PEP interacts with the local policy service, which mainly consists of
the following components: LPDP, cached policy, and COPS adapter. The LPDP is
responsible for making policy decisions based on the input from the SicAri security
manager (PEP) and a locally cached version of the master security policy. The
LPDP is realized by an extended version of Sun’s XACML reference implementa-
tion (see below). The PEP uses the Java-API of Sun’s XACML engine in order to
communicate with the LPDP. A (potentially remote) policy provisioning component
provides a copy of the latest master policy to the LPDP using the COPS protocol.
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COPS Policy Outsourcing
The main characteristic of the second scenario is that a local PEP delegates all
policy decisions to a remote PDP. This scenario is not yet implemented.
The policy service mainly consists of a COPS adapter which transforms the
policy decision request of the PEP into an XACML policy request. The COPS
adapter sends this request to the remote PDP which is responsible for providing the
policy decision based on the master security policy. The XACML policy decision
response is sent back from the remote PDP via COPS to the local PEP which
enforces the policy decision.
4.3 XACML over COPS
We extended the COPS framework with an XACML client type. All COPSmessages
start with a common header that determines the message type and the payload type.
Figure 6 shows the schema of this header whose relevant ﬁelds are described below.
Fig. 6. Common COPS header
The Op Code indicates the type of the message, e. g. REQ or KA. The Client Type
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ﬁeld provides a code that uniquely identiﬁes the payload carried in the message. For
example client-type number 1 is a published Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA) number assigned to RSVP policy data [9].
Each COPS message may consist of diﬀerent COPS objects. The message con-
tent is wrapped with the help of 16 diﬀerent predeﬁned COPS objects. Some of
these objects provide ﬁelds to carry client-type speciﬁc data.
The most important object is the afore mentioned ClientSI object that has
variable length and transports the client-type data. Figure 7 depicts the generic
COPS object structure. Depending on the type of COPS message that is signaled
zero, one or more COPS objects may follow the COPS header.
0 1 2 3
Length (octets) C−TypeC−Num
Object contents
Fig. 7. Generic COPS object
The C-Num and C-Type ﬁelds determine the class and the characteristics of the
object. For ClientSI objects the C-Num ﬁeld is 9 and the variable length ﬁeld for
the object content carries the policy data. This data has to be processed by special
COPS modules that can interpret the corresponding client type speciﬁc information.
Our implementation bases on an open source implementation of the COPS protocol
from the University of Waterloo [1,3]. We extended their PBN code with several
classes to multiplex incoming COPS messages at the PDP to modules which handle
client-speciﬁc content like XACML.
4.4 XACML Client Type for the COPS Protocol
As the next step a concept to extend the COPS protocol to transport XACML
polices as payload has been developed. For any extension to the COPS protocol
one has to take the peculiarity of the target policy language into account. The
structure of the client-type speciﬁc objects and the protocol extensions should be
speciﬁed in a supplementary document that deﬁnes how the PEP and the PDP
interpret and handle the policy speciﬁc payload.
Any XACML policy document is structured according to the respectively ef-
fective XACML schema. The XACML data ﬂow model deﬁnes that a Policy Ad-
ministration Point (PAP) provides the PDP with XACML documents that contain
sets of policy and policyset elements. It is speciﬁed in the XACML schema that
policy and policyset elements can be nested inside a policyset. The distribu-
tion of XACML client-type data in the conﬁguration mode will base on this tree
structure of XACML documents. Any leaf and any node of such a document will be
encapsulated in a single COPS object and send alone or in a group in a decision
message from the PDP to PEP. Our concept considers the policy and policyset
elements as such leaf and node objects since they deﬁne logical building blocks of
a policy. The PEP acknowledges any such COPS message with XACML content
with a COPS report message. On COPS’ PEP side the policy and policyset
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building blocks are assembled back into a copy of the XACML master policy which
is passed on to the LPDP as deﬁned in SicAri.
The XML structure provides another advantage with respect to the proactive
update and delete mechanism of COPS PDPs. A PDP can address any policy
element in the XACML document using XPATH. Any administrative task mod-
ifying the master policy triggers a COPS message for the corresponding policy
and policyset element that has been changed. This COPS message will transport
one or more COPS decision objects containing replacement data that uniquely
identiﬁes the processed policy elements using XPATH objects. This way the PDP
can generate ﬁne-granular updates at the XML element level. The COPS protocol
assures that both, PEP and PDP, always work on the same XACML document.
Any policy document is deﬁnitely identiﬁed by the TCP connection between PEP
and PDP together with the client handle that the PEP uniquely assigns to each
request that it sends out.
5 Related Work
In [17], Ponnappan et al. describe a policy based QoS management system for
IntServ/DiﬀServ networks. This design uses COPS for interfacing with the network
devices and CORBA as middleware for component interaction.
An approach presented in [20] by Toktar et al. proposes an XACML-based
framework for distributing and enforcing access control policies to RSVP-aware ap-
plication servers. Access control policies are represented in an extension of XACML
(based on Sun XACML) which is an alternative to the IETF Policy Core Infor-
mation Model (PCIM) [10] based approach. The authors use COPS in outsorcing
mode to distribute policy requests and decisions between the policy server and the
RSVP server that is responsible to enforce the QoS measures.
In his dissertation [16], K. Phanse proposes a management framework for policy
based ad hoc network management. He builds on a distributed, hybrid architecture
that combines the outsourcing and provisioning models of COPS and COPS-PR to
provide an eﬃcient and ﬂexible solution for policy distribution in wireless ad hoc
networks. To translate the policy speciﬁcation into device-speciﬁc conﬁguration,
the management framework must be aware of the various resources available in the
system. Policy provisioning occurs after policies are distributed, and consists of
installing and implementing the policies using device speciﬁc mechanisms.
Since COPS seems to be the only open service for policy distribution of notable
propagation we ﬁnd it hard to compare our approach to others. While it is diﬃcult
to make a quantitative statement on the eﬃciency to transport XACML policies
via COPS it is easier to give a qualitative predication. COPS realizes some design
aspects that improve eﬃcient distribution and maintenance of distributed policies.
After provisioning the initial policy in conﬁguration mode to the LPDPs the central
PDP keeps them up-to-date with unsolicited decision messages whenever some part
of the policy changes. Since COPS allows to transport policy parts of arbitrary size
it is up to the developer of the payload extension to optimize the communication
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overhead. COPS only demands that the transported pieces are uniquely address-
able. This perfectly ﬁts to XACML because XPATH and unique element identiﬁers
allow to address and transport only those pieces of the master policy that have
really changed. Furthermore, COPS in conﬁguration mode promises to economi-
cally use network resources because access control policies are not very likely to be
changed frequently. This enables the administrator to choose a higher value for the
KA timeout thus reducing the communication overhead when there are no updates.
The only drawback lurks in the fact that XACML is an XML-based language which
are inherently wordy.
6 Outlook
It is planned to implement the mechanism to encapsulate XACML payload in COPS
messages as described in Section 4.4. The open source JDOM (http://www.jdom.
org/) package for parsing and representing XACML documents as objects seems a
viable basis to build a solution upon.
We will furthermore develop a concept to use the policy administration, policy
validation, and policy provisioning mechanisms implemented in the platform, to
manage other policy domains such as network security policies (e. g. to conﬁgure
external PEPs such as ﬁrewalls).
An additional research aspect with respect to a holistic policy approach in dis-
tributed environments will be policy negotiation in case services from two diﬀerent
security domains, enforcing security upon two diﬀerent security policies, have to
interact with each other.
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